The growth of the private equity industry has spurred concerns about its potential impact on the economy more generally. This analysis looks across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity on industry performance. Industries where private equity funds have invested in the past five years have grown more quickly in terms of productivity and employment. There are few significant differences between industries with limited and high private equity activity. It is hard to find support for claims that economic activity in industries with private equity backing is more exposed to aggregate shocks. Robustness tests suggest that the results are not driven by reverse causality. These patterns are not driven solely by common law nations such as the United Kingdom and United States, but also hold in Continental Europe.
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In response to the global financial crisis that began in 2007, governments worldwide are rethinking their approach to regulating financial institutions. Among the financial institutions that have fallen under the gaze of regulators have been private equity (PE) funds (see, for instance, European Commission [2009] ). There are many open questions regarding the economic impact of PE funds, many of which cannot be definitively answered until the aftermath of the buyout boom of the mid-2000s can be fully assessed.
This paper addresses one of these open questions, by examining the impact of PE investments across 20 industries in 26 major nations between 1991 and 2007. We focus on whether PE investments in an industry affect aggregate growth and cyclicality. In particular, we look at the relationship between the presence of PE investments and the growth rates of productivity, employment and capital formation. For our productivity and employment measures, we find that PE investments are associated with faster growth. One natural concern is that this growth may have come at the expense of greater cyclicality in the industry, which would translate into greater risks for investors and stakeholders. Thus, we also examine whether economic fluctuations are exacerbated by the presence of PE investments, but we find little evidence that this is the case.
Throughout our analysis we measure the growth rate in a particular industry relative to the average growth rate across countries in the same year. In addition, we use country and industry fixed effects (FEs), so that the impact of PE activity is measured relative to the average performance in a given country, industry, and year. For instance, if the Swedish steel industry has more PE investment than the Finnish one, we examine whether the steel industry in these two countries performs better or worse over time relative to the average performance of the steel industry across all countries in our sample, and whether the variations in performance over the industry cycles are more or less dramatic.
Overall, we are unable to find evidence supporting any detrimental effect of PE investments on industries:  Industries where PE funds have been active in the past five years grow more rapidly than other sectors, whether measured using total production, value added, total wages, or employment. In industries with PE investments, there are few significant differences between industries with a low and high level of PE activity.
 Activity in industries with PE backing appears to be no more volatile in the face of industry cycles than in other industries, and sometimes less so. The reduced volatility is particularly apparent in total wages and employment.
 These patterns continue to hold when we focus on the impact of private equity in continental Europe, where concerns about these investments have been most often expressed.
We believe it is unlikely that these results are driven by reverse causality, i.e., PE funds selecting to invest in industries that are growing faster and/or are less volatile. The results are essentially unchanged if we only consider the impact of PE investments made between five and two years earlier on industry performance. Granger causality tests suggest that past PE investment causes industry performance, while past industry performance has no impact on future PE investment. The results continue to hold when we use an instrumental variables technique employing the size of the private pension and insurance company asset pool in the nation and year as a percentage of GDP. This paper is related to papers that examine the modest and mixed literature competitive effects of private equity. Chevalier [1995a Chevalier [ , 1995b shows that buyouts of supermarket chains lead to positive outcomes for local rivals. These rivals are more likely to enter or expand in an urban region if there are a number of firms that have undergone buyouts and charge higher prices in these markets. She suggests these results are consistent with "softer" product market competition. Hsu, Reed and Rocholl [2010] , on the other hand, show that rivals experience a decrease in their stock prices and their operating performance around the time of private equity investments in their industry, while competitors" stock prices increase when a previously announced private equity deal is withdrawn. The effects are particularly pronounced for more specialized and experienced private equity groups.
It is important to note some limitations of this analysis. First, the question of economic growth and volatility is only one of many questions that regulators must grapple with when assessing the impact of PE investment. Among the unaddressed topics are the impact on the distribution of wealth across society and the competitive dynamics across industries. Second, it is still too early to assess the consequences of the economic conditions in 2008 and 2009, a period where the decrease of investment and absolute volume of distressed private equity-backed assets was greater than in earlier cycles.
The plan of this study is as follows: In the following section, we develop the hypotheses to be tested. The second section describes the construction of the dataset, and the results are presented in Section Three. The final section concludes the paper.
INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE AND PRIVATE EQUITY
Several alternative perspectives have been offered as to how PE investments affect the prospects of an industry. In this section, we begin by reviewing the suggestions about changes regarding overall performance; we then turn to hypotheses regarding the interaction between economic cycles and PE investments.
A. The impact of PE Investments on Industry Performance
Our initial examination focuses on the performance of industries where PE funds have been active relative to industries where these investors have not been active.
A central hypothesis since Jensen [1989] has been that private equity has the ability to improve the operations of firms. By closely monitoring managers, restricting free cash flow through the use of leverage and incentivizing managers with equity, it is argued, private equitybacked firms are able to improve operations in the firms they back. In this article, Jensen suggested that these leveraged buyouts (LBOs) may not only affect the bought-out firm itself but may also increase competitive pressure and force competitors to improve their own operations. John et al. [1992] present supporting empirical evidence that the threat of takeover serves as a spur for firms to voluntarily undertake restructurings.
The claim that private equity-backed firms have improved operations has been supported by a number of empirical studies, which focus on the effects on the individual private equitybacked companies. Kaplan [1989] examines changes in accounting performance for 76 large management buyouts of public companies between 1980 and 1986. He shows that in the three years after the transaction operating income, cash flow and market value all increase. He argues that these increases reflect the impact of improved incentives rather than layoffs. (Looking at more recent deals on US public-to-private transactions, however, Guo et al. [2009] find only weak evidence that gains in operating performance of bought-out firms exceed those of their peers.) Muscarella and Vetsuypens [1990] examine 72 "reverse LBOs" (RLBOs), that is, companies taken private which went public once again. These firms experienced a dramatic increase in profitability, which they argue is a reflection of cost reductions.
More recent studies have used large samples and a variety of performance measures to more directly assess whether private equity makes a difference in the management of the firms in which they invest. Bloom et al. [2009] survey over 4,000 firms in Asia, Europe and the US to assess their management practices. They show that private equity-backed firms are on average the best-managed ownership group in the sample, though they cannot rule out the possibility that these firms were better managed before the PE transaction. Davis et al. [2009] compare all USbased manufacturing establishments that received PE investments between 1980 and 2005 with similar establishments that did not receive PE investments. 1 They show that private equitybacked firms experienced a substantial productivity growth advantage (about two percentage points) in the two years following the transaction. About two-thirds of this differential is due to improved productivity among continuing establishments of the firms. Cao and Lerner [2009] examine the three-and five-year stock performance of 496 RLBOs between 1980 and 2002.
RLBOs appear to consistently outperform other IPOs and the stock market as a whole. Large RLBOs that are backed by PE firms with more capital under management perform better, while quick flipswhen PE firms sell off an investment soon after acquisitionunderperform.
These findings might suggest that we would see superior performance for PE firms, regardless of the economic conditions. Moreover, if PE firms represent a significant fraction of the activity in certain industries (and tabulations in several countries, including the US and UK, suggest that this is the case), there may also be a positive effect at the industry level.
Investigating the industry level allows us to capture the "contagion" effects arising if improvements in bought-out firms spur their competitors to improve. This effect is not captured by studies focusing on the individual portfolio companies.
While there has been little systematic evidence regarding the deleterious effects of private equity on firms and industries, critics have pointed to case studies that illustrate the negative consequences of the transactions. For instance, Rasmussen [2008] points to the buyout of Britain"s Automobile Association, which led to large-scale layoffs and service disruptions while generating substantial profits for the transaction"s sponsor, Permira. The Service Employees International Union [2007 and 2008] presents studies that show the deleterious effect that excessive leverage, cost-cutting and poor managerial decisions by PE groups can have on firms and industries in cases such as Hawaiian Telecom, Intelsat, KB Toys and TDC. These case studies suggest that the impact of private equity on industries may be more negative than suggested by the previous studies.
B. The Impact of Economic Cycles
Numerous practitioner accounts have suggested that the PE industry is highly cyclical, with periods of easy financing availability (often in response to the successes of earlier transactions) leading to an acceleration of deal volume, greater use of leverage, higher valuations, and ultimately more troubled investments (akin to the well-known "corn-hog cycle" in agricultural economics).
This pattern is corroborated in several academic studies. Axelson et al. [2010] document the cyclical use of leverage in buyouts. Using a sample of 1,157 transactions completed by major groups worldwide between 1985 and 2008, they show that the level of leverage is driven by the cost of debt, rather than the more industry-and firm-specific factors that affect leverage in publicly traded firms. The use of leverage is also strongly associated with higher valuation levels and lower PE fund returns. Kaplan and Stein [1993] document that the 1980s buyout boom saw an increase in valuations, reliance on public debt and incentive problems (for example, parties cashing out at the time of transaction). Moreover, in the transactions done at the market peak, the outcomes were disappointing: of the 66 largest buyouts completed between 1986 and 1988, 38% experienced financial distress, which they define as default or an actual or attempted restructuring of debt obligations due to difficulties in making payments. 27% actually did default on debt repayments, often in conjunction with a Chapter 11 filing. Kaplan and Schoar [2005] and other papers provide indirect supporting evidence, showing that the performance of funds is negatively correlated with inflows into these funds. Private equity funds raised during periods of high capital inflowswhich are typically associated with market peaksperform far worse than their peers.
These findings corroborate the suggestions that availability of financing impacts booms and busts in the PE market. If firms completing buyouts at market peaks employ leverage excessively, we may expect industries with heavy buyout activity to experience more intense subsequent downturns. Moreover, the effects of this overinvestment would be exacerbated if PE investments drive rivals not backed by private equity to aggressively invest and leverage themselves. Chevalier [1995b] shows that in regions with supermarkets receiving PE investments the rivals responded by adding and expanding stores.
An alternative perspective, suggested by some recent events in the PE industry, is that private equity-backed firms may do better during downturns because their investors constitute a concentrated shareholder base, which can continue to provide equity financing in a way that might be difficult to arrange for other companies during downturns. To cite two recent examples of "equity cures," Terra Firma made a number of investments in EMI, while Kraton Polymers" equity investors (Ripplewood and CCMP) did likewise during the recent recession. 2 This perspective would imply that private equity-backed companies may actually outperform their peers during downturns, as they have access to equity financing that other firms do not have. The presence of liquid PE funds as shareholders may lead to fewer failures in difficult economic conditions.
A related argument, originally proposed by Jensen [1989] , is that the high levels of debt in PE transactions force firms to respond earlier and more forcefully to negative shocks to their business. As a result, private equity-backed firms may be forced to adjust their operations more rapidly at the beginning of an industry downturn, enabling them to better weather a recession.
Even if some private equity-backed firms eventually end up in financial distress, their underlying operations may thus be in better shape than their peers. This facilitates an efficient restructuring of their capital structure and lowers the deadweight costs on the economy. Consistent with this argument, Andrade and Kaplan [1998] study 31 distressed leveraged buyouts from the 1980s that subsequently became financially distressed, and found that the value of the firms post-distress was slightly higher than the value before the buyout, suggesting that even the leveraged buyouts that were hit most severely by adverse shocks added some economic value.
Finally, the structural differences between PE funds and other financial institutions may make them less susceptible to industry shocks. A major source of concern for financial institutions is the so-called "run on the bank" phenomenon. Runs occur when holders of shortterm liabilities, for example, depositors or repo counterparties, simultaneously refuse to provide additional financing and demand their money back. Other versions of this phenomenon arise when companies simultaneously draw down lines of credit, hedge fund investors simultaneously ask for redemptions of their investments, or a freeze in the market for commercial paper prevents structured investment vehicles (SIVs) from rolling over short-term commercial paper. It is unlikely that PE investments create dangers through this mechanism. Private equity funds are typically prevented from borrowing themselves, and the funds" only claimants are their limited partners (LPs), which are typically bound by 10-year lock-up agreements. Hence, the funds have no short-term creditors that can run. Still, extensive loans may be provided to the individual portfolio companies. However, these loans are typically made by a concentrated set of lenders and are without recourse to other portfolio companies or the fund generally. Hence, an individual creditor"s ability to be repaid is largely unaffected by the actions of other creditors, mitigating the incentive to run.
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
To analyze how PE investments affect industries, we combine two datasets, one containing information about PE investments compiled by Capital IQ, and another with industry activity and performance across the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries included in the OECD"s Structural Analysis Database (STAN).
A. PE Investment Sample
We use the Capital IQ database to construct a base sample of PE transactions. From the base sample, we select all M&A transactions classified as "leveraged buyout," "management buyout," or "going private" that were announced between January 1986 and December 2007 and where the target company is located in an OECD country included in the STAN database. We exclude transactions that were announced but not yet completed as well as transactions that did not involve a financial investor (for example, a buyout led and executed by the management team itself was excluded).
This results in a sample of about 14,300 transactions, involving 13,100 distinct firms.
Since we only have information about the deal size for 50% of our transactions (though more of the larger transactions), we impute missing deal sizes by constructing fitted values from a regression of deal size on fixed effects for country, investment year and target industry. Using the imputed transaction sizes, we generate aggregate country-year-industry measures of PE volume in the form of summed deal sizes.
B. Industry Data
The STAN database provides industry data across OECD countries compiled from national statistics offices. It contains economic information at the country, year and industry level. Thus, a typical observation would be the German transport equipment industry in 1999.
STAN includes measures of productivity, employment and capital formation, as described in Table 1 . Throughout this paper, we focus on the following measures of industry activity:
 Production (gross output), the value of goods and/or services produced in a year, whether sold or stocked, in current prices.
 Value added represents the industry"s contribution to national GDP, i.e., output net of materials purchased. While the methodology for constructing this measure differs across nations, our focus here is on differences across time, which should reduce the effect of national differences in the measure.
 Labor costs, which comprise wages and salaries of employees paid by producers as well as supplements such as contributions to social security, private pensions, health insurance, life insurance and similar schemes.
 Number of employees, which is the traditional measure of employment, excluding selfemployed and unpaid family members working in the business.
 Gross capital formation is acquisitions, less disposals, of new tangible assets, as well as such intangible assets as mineral exploration and computer software. This variable is the closest aggregate to capital expenditures.
 Consumption of fixed capital measures the reduction in the value of fixed assets used in production resulting from physical deterioration or normal obsolescence.
C. Mapping Capital IQ to STAN Industries
Industries in the STAN database are classified by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code. To link these data to the industry-aggregated PE activity, we matched the ISIC codes with Capital IQ"s industry classifications. We used the existing mapping from Capital IQ industry classification into SIC codes, and then used the existing matching between SIC and ISIC industries. The mapping of Capital IQ industry classifications to SIC codes includes only matches for the most detailed levels of the Capital IQ classifications. This poses a problem for more aggregated industries for which Capital IQ does not provide a match to a SIC and ultimately to ISIC. When the Capital IQ target industry is at a more aggregated industry level, we mapped all four-digit SIC codes that belong to the sub-categories of the industry classification of Capital IQ. In these cases, we had multiple four-digit SIC codes for a single Capital IQ industry. In some of the transactions all of the four-digit SICs corresponded to the same ISIC industry classification, creating a one-to-one mapping. In cases where the four-digit SIC codes corresponded to different industries in the ISIC scheme, we considered the particular deals and selected the most suitable industry. In 390 transactions, we were not able to determine with certainty the appropriate match in ISIC, and those transactions were dropped, leaving us with 13,910 PE transactions with ISIC classifications. Finally, we grouped ISIC sub-industries to balance PE activity across industries. Table 2 presents In each table, we first present the number of observations and the number of those that are PE industries as defined above. We then present the number of deals, transaction volume and the transaction volume including the imputed sizes of deals with missing information. Several patterns are visible:
 The heavy representation of buyouts as a share of economic activity in traditional industries, such as "Textiles, textile products, leather," "Machinery and equipment," "Pulp, paper, paper products, printing," "Electrical and optical equipment," and "Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products".
 The acceleration in buyout activity, first modestly during the late 1980s and then especially in the mid-2000s.
 The greater level of activity in a handful of traditional hubs for PE funds, including the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 3
In Table 5 , we present a simple comparison of the growth the industry measures for PE and non-PE industries. PE industries grow more quickly in terms of output and value added, as well in terms of employment. But for gross fixed capital formation, the PE industries have a slower growth rate.
One natural question is the whether the volume of buyouts during this period is sufficiently large to have a material impact on the industries in which the funds invest. The most direct approach is to look at the implied share of private equity investments in the 26 economies in our sample. We wish to compute the mean share of total industry value represented by private equity transactions annually.
Because enterprise value is not available for privately held firms, we must approximate this measure. In particular, we compute from Global Compustat a "revenue multiple" for each industry and year: the ratio between the aggregate enterprise value of all publicly traded firms (the sum of the market value of equity, plus the book value of debt and preferred stock) across all sample nations and the revenues for all these firms. 4 We then assume that this ratio also characterizes the privately held firms in the industry in the same industry and year. Thus, we estimate the ratio of the aggregate volume of private equity investments in each industry and year (not using imputed deals, in order to be conservative) and the product of the estimated revenue multiple and the aggregate production by public and private firms, as estimated by the OECD. 5 These ratios vary by year, reflecting the ebb and flow of private equity activity. If we look at the average annual share of private equity activity across the entire sample period by industry, it varies from 0.9% (for transport equipment) to 13.5% (for machinery and equipment).
The weighted average across all industries is 4.35%, with an inter-quartile range from 2.5% to 7.1%. This suggests that for the typical industry, the impact of private equity over this period is quite substantial, especially in light of the five-to-seven holding period which characterizes the typical private equity investment (Strömberg [2008] ).
It can also be argued that this measure understates the volume and of private equity activity. Not only are transactions with missing data excluded, but we know that Capital IQ"s coverage is incomplete, particularly when it comes to add-on acquisitions by firms in the portfolio of private equity groups. In addition, we are excluding non-control transactions (e.g., the purchase of a minority stake in a company by a private equity group).
Moreover, it can be anticipated that the effect of having a significant fraction of firms in an industry under buyout ownership may have substantial effects on competitors as well, As discussed, the work of Chevalier [1995a Chevalier [ , 1995b suggests that the impact of private equity extends beyond the bought-out firms, but also effects the behavior of rivals, a finding which is corroborated by Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl"s [2010] event study. Similarly, Oxman and Yildrim (2008) find evidence suggesting that PE corporate governance practices spill over on competitors after a buyout.
ANALYSIS

A. Industry Performance
We begin by examining the relationship between various industry characteristics and the role of private equity in the industry. In each case, we use the industry-country-year as an observation, and the explanatory variable is the relative growth rate along a given dimension (for example, employment). This relative rate is computed by subtracting the growth rate experienced in that industry, country and year from the average growth rate across countries in that same industry and year. Demeaning the growth rate in this way is largely equivalent to including yearindustry fixed effects, and it allows for an easier interpretation of the estimated parameters.
We employ several specifications. First, we look at specifications that include controls for each year, industry and country. For the exogenous variable, we include an indicator which denotes whether the industry is a PE industry or not, using the above definition. Note that this definition does not use the imputed deal values, since it only depends on the presence of PE deals. Second, we use two indicators to capture whether an industry is a low or high PE industry.
A low PE industry (PE 5 Low) is a PE industry where the fraction of total imputed PE investments divided by total production (both normalized to 2008 USD) is smaller than the median (conditional on having a non-zero level of PE investment). 6 We also perform the analysis dividing PE activity into quartiles to better measure the differential effects of different activity levels. Third, we include fixed effects to capture heterogeneity at the level of individual countries and industries (Co-Ind FE denotes the country-industry specific fixed effect). These controls allow us to more precisely capture national differences in the industry dynamics: if there is any effect from a PE investment, it is because the growth rate is fast during that specific period.
The results in Table 6 indicate that industries with PE deals have significantly higher growth rates of production and value added. For instance, in the first regression, the coefficient of 0.906 implies that the total production of an average PE industry grows at an annual rate that is 0.906% higher than a non-PE industry. (Table 5 reports that the mean growth rate is 5.9%.)
We report the significance of a statistical test for differences between high and low PE industries and differences between the four quartiles of PE activity (reported as PE L = PE H ). We find few differences in total production between high and low PE industries, although the specification using quartiles suggests that the positive effect may be particularly strong for industries with an intermediate level of PE activity. Value added for an industry appears to be increasing in the amount of PE activity, with the differences between high and low PE industries being statistically and economically significant.
One concern is the direction of causality. It is possible that PE investors pick industries that are anticipated to start growing, and our results may reflect this industry choice rather than the causal effect of the investments on the industry. To mitigate this concern, we change our definition of the PE industry measure to only include investments during the period from two to five years prior to the observation, called the twice-lagged measure (the original PE measure included all five years prior to the observation). The results are reported in Table 7 . We find that the results are very similar, indicating that the effect that we find is unlikely to be driven by PE investors entering countries and industries where they expect stronger immediate growth. Table 8 considers measures of employment. PE industries appear to grow significantly faster in terms of labor costs and the number of employees. The annual growth rate of total labor cost is 0.5 to 1.4 percentage points greater for PE industries, and the number of employees grows at an annual rate that is 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points greater. These findings are particularly surprising, since a common concern is that PE investors act aggressively to reduce costs with little concern for employees. This concern is not necessarily inconsistent with our results.
Despite initial employment reductions at private equity-backed firms, the greater subsequent growth in total production, observed in Table 6 , may lead to subsequent employment growth in the industry overall. Considering the specifications with PE activity quartiles, industries with more PE activity appear to have more rapid growth of total labor costs, but the growth rate of the number of employees is fastest in industries with more moderate levels of PE activity.
Regardless of the level of PE activity, however, the PE industries" growth rates of labor costs and employment always exceed the rates for non-PE industries.
As above, we are concerned about the direction of causality, and Table 9 repeats the analysis using the twice-lagged PE measure. The magnitudes in Tables 8 and 9 are largely similar, suggesting that the effect we find is not mainly driven by PE investors picking industries with expectations of immediate employment growth.
Finally, in Table 10 we examine measures of fixed capital formation and consumption of fixed capital. These measures appear much more volatile than the production and employment measures, making it difficult to discern any relationship between PE investments and capital formation. 7
B. Cyclical Patterns
We next turn to analyzing how private equity relates to industry cycles. For each industry and year, we calculate the average growth by averaging the growth rate of the productivity and employment measures across countries. This measures the annual aggregate shock in these variables (for example, production output in the steel industry fell by 2% on average in 2002 across the nations in our sample). We then investigate whether PE industries are more or less exposed to this shock by including the PE measure interacted with this average growth measure in the regressions. If PE industries are more sensitive to economic conditions, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive: during upturns, these industries grow faster than average and during downturns they decline faster. A negative coefficient indicates a lower exposure to the aggregate shock than industries without PE investments. Once again, we use country and industry fixed effects, as well as country-industry fixed effect interactions.
In Tables 11 and 12 , we examine the impact on production and employment. Across all the regressions, the interaction terms are negative, which implies that PE industries are less sensitive to industry shocks. To interpret the coefficients, using the estimates in the first regression in Table 12 , if an industry on average experiences a 5% increase in total labor costs in a given year (the aggregate shock), a PE industry will experience, on average, a 5.576% increase (5% + 1.591% + 5% x -0.203 = 5.576%). Conversely, following a 5% decrease in labor costs, a PE industry will only experience, on average, a 2.394% decline (-5% + 1.591% + (-5%) x -0.203 = -2.394%). Hence, an aggregate swing from +5% to -5% (10% total difference) in aggregate growth rates translates into a swing from 5.6% to -2.4% (8% total difference) in the growth rates for PE industries. Both for the productivity and employment analyses, the coefficients are significantly negative in the simple specification and most of the coefficients in the employment analysis remain statistically significant when high and low PE industries are included separately. Overall, it appears that PE activity translates into smaller employment fluctuations than average, but industries with a larger amount of PE activity may follow a growth pattern that is closer to that of the industry as a whole.
C. Geographic Patterns
One concern is that the impact of private equity is different in continental Europe than in the United States and United Kingdom. Not only is the level of PE activity higher in the US and UK than in most other nations, but the industry is more established, having begun in these two nations. We thus repeat the analysis, looking at US and UK versus Continental Europe (Japan and South Korea are excluded from these analyses).
We report the results in Tables 13 and 14 , which repeat the base specifications reported in Tables 6 and 8. All the main effects remain largely unchanged for the Continental Europe sample. The coefficients in the US and UK sample are generally not statistically significant but they are not statistically different from the coefficients for the Continental Europe sample either.
This probably reflects the small size of the US and UK sample and the resulting large standard errors. For productivity, value added and labor costs the coefficients are smaller in the US and UK than in Continental Europe, while the coefficient for total employment is larger.
D. Addressing Causality Concerns
One natural concern relates to the interpretation of these results. While it appears that private equity is associated with more rapid growth at an industry level in our analyses, it is natural to wonder which way the causation runs. Does the presence of private equity lead to better performance, or do PE investors invest where they (correctly) anticipate industries will grow?
We respond to this question in several ways. Each of these approaches is imperfect, but collectively they produce a consistent answer.
First, in the reported analyses, we looked at PE investments during the five years before the measured growth. As discussed above, we have also narrowed our measure to only include deals in the second through fifth year prior to the investment. If our effects are due to PE investors anticipating subsequent growth in particular sectors, they would have to be quite prescient to anticipate future growth two years in advance.
Second, we address this concern using an instrumental variables technique. To identify exogenous variation, we use the size of the private pension and insurance company asset pool in the nation and year, expressed as a percentage of GDP. This kind of identification strategy has been employed previously in other papers in the venture capital literature, such as Kortum and Lerner [2000] and Mollica and Zingales [2007] . In nations with larger pension and insurance pools, domestic PE funds are more likely to raise capital and invest it locally. 8 This is an attractive instrumental variable, because pension policy and insurance regulation are typically driven by broader socio-economic considerations, rather than the activity in the local PE industry.
For this analysis, we supplement the dataset with data on financial assets held by domestic autonomous pension funds and insurance corporations from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 9 Table 15 presents the distribution of financial assets across countries. The instruments for the PE variable we employ are financial assets normalized with country"s GDP, along with country and industry fixed effects. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 16 , which also includes regular OLS estimates for comparison. With the exception of number of employees, the previous results of a positive impact of private equity investment on industry performance are robust. The coefficients on the PE investment variable actually increase substantially in magnitude. In unreported analyses, we repeat the exercise using lagged and twice lagged assets-to-GDP instrument. Also in this case, the results remain consistent with the rest of the analysis.
Third, we address the endogeneity issue using Granger causality (Granger [1969] ). This empirical approach investigates the relative timing of related time series, in our case PE investments relative to productivity and employment growth. PE investments will Granger-cause productivity growth (or employment growth) if a previous increase in PE investments are associated with a subsequent increase in productivity, but a previous increase in productivity growth is unrelated with subsequent changes in PE investments. Granger causality has been widely studied and applied in macroeconomics, and there has been substantial debate over the interpretation of the causality concept. The concerns and caveats are well understood. Since we have separate time series for each country-industry pair, we adopt a panel Granger analysis. This is a more recent extension of the traditional approach and, currently, less established (see discussion in Hartwig [2009] ). We do not attempt to extend this methodology, and we simply adopt a parsimonious and natural empirical specification.
We estimate a three-equation system of linear equations. The endogenous variables are the productivity and employment growth rates and an indicator of PE activity (here, we here use an indicator for PE activity in each year, not the past five years as used above). The exogenous variables are lags of the endogenous variables in addition to country and industry fixed effects. We estimate the system using GLS (SUR) taking into account cross-equation correlations in the error terms.
Estimated coefficients using two different specifications of the lags are reported in Table   17 . Note that the coefficients from the system regressions are identical to the coefficients one would obtain from estimating single-equation OLS regressions. The reported standard errors, however, adjust for cross-equation correlations in the error terms. In the first equation we see evidence that PE investments Granger-cause productivity and employment growth. However, in the third equation we find no evidence that increases in productivity or employment growth are associated with subsequent PE investments. Indeed, the individual coefficients are all insignificant and Wald tests for the joint significance of either the productivity or labor coefficients do not reject the hypothesis that they are zero. Combined, this evidence indicates that the direction of causality likely flows from PE investments to productivity and employment growth.
It is well known that including FEs in dynamic panel models can lead to biased estimators (see Nickell [1981] ). Given our long panelour dataset spans the years 1991 to 2007 we suspect that this problem has negligible effect on our estimates. Nevertheless, Table 18 reports estimates of the system-GMM approaches developed by Arellano and Bond [1991] and Blundell and Bond [1998] to address this bias. One advantage of these specifications is that they involve first-differencing the endogenous variables, corresponding to including country-industry fixed effects. Overall, the Granger causality results are robust to these specifications as well.
While they suggest that past employment and productivity growth are significantly associated with future PE investments, the corresponding coefficients are small in magnitudes.
CONCLUSIONS
The growth of the PE industry has spurred concerns about its potential impact on the economy more generally. In this analysis, we look across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity on industry performance.
The key results are, first, that industries where PE funds have invested in the past five years have grown more quickly, using a variety of measures. There are few significant differences between industries with low and high PE activity. Second, it is hard to find support for claims that economic activity in industries with PE backing is more exposed to aggregate shocks. Various approaches suggest that the results are not driven by reverse causality. Finally, these patterns are not driven solely by common law nations such as the United Kingdom and United States, but also hold in Continental Europe.
These findings suggest a number of avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to look at finer data on certain critical aspects of industry performance, such as the rates of layoffs, plant closings and openings, and product and process innovations. Second, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which the presence of private equity-backed firms affects their peers. While Chevalier"s [1995b] study of the supermarket industry during the 1980s was an important first step, much more remains to be explored here. Finally, we are limited by the available data. The buyout boom of the mid 2000s was so massive, and the subsequent crash in activity so dramatic, that the consequences may have been substantially different from other economic cycles (see Kosman [2009] ). The impact of the recent cycle will be an important issue to explore in coming years. The table contains OLS and 2SLS regression coefficients. An observation is a country-industry-year pair. The endogenous variable is the deviation of the annual growth rate of production, value added, labor costs, and total employment (as defined by OECD) relative to the average rate in the same industry and year. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE activity over the previous five years at the countryindustry level (PE 5 ), and industry-and country-fixed effects as indicated. The OLS specifications corresponds to specifications in Table 6 and 8, but are repeated here for convenience. The 2SLS specifications use the fraction of assets held by domestic institutional investors to GDP to instrument PE, along with country and industry fixed effects in the first stage. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level (both at first and second stage) and are presented in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
(1) Table 17 : Granger Causality (SUR). The table contains coefficients from two specifications of a linear SUR/VAR model, each with three equations. Columns 1-3 contain estimates of the first specification; columns 4-6 contain the second one. Endogenous variables are productivity growth (deviation from annual industry average), labor growth (deviation from annual industry average), and a PE indicator (equals one for each country-industry-year with any PE activity). Exogenous variables are lagged endogenous variables with the lag in parentheses and industry-and countryfixed effects. Note that the coefficients, but not the standard errors, are identical to those obtained from six single-equation OLS regressions. Reported standard errors allow for cross-equation correlations. Significance levels of Wald tests of the joint significance of the PE, productivity, and labor coefficients are reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
(1) (1) 0.137*** 0.161*** 0.000 0.154*** 0.166*** 0.000 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) Prod. Growth (2) -0.110*** 0.041*** -0.000 -0.051*** 0.055*** -0.000 (0.016) (0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.011) (0.001) Prod. Growth (3) 0.093*** 0.076*** -0.000 0.086*** 0.065*** -0.001 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) Prod. Growth (4) 0.005 0.006 -0.000 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) Prod. Growth (5) 0.145*** 0.065*** 0.001 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) Labor Growth (1) 0.071*** 0.089*** -0.000 0.068*** 0.088*** -0.001 (0.022) (0.016) (0.001) (0.022) (0.016) (0.001) Labor Growth (2) -0.008 -0.032** -0.000 -0.014 -0.026* -0.000 (0.022) (0.016) (0.001) (0.022) (0.015) (0.001) Labor Growth (3) -0.007 -0.054*** -0.001 0.009 -0.032** -0.001 (0.021) (0.015) (0.001) (0.020) (0.014) (0.001) Labor Growth (4) -0.065*** -0.025* -0.002* (0.020) (0.014) (0.001) Labor Growth (5) Arellano and Bond (1991) ; specifications 4-6 follow Blundell and Bond (1998) . Endogenous variables are productivity growth (deviation from annual industry average), labor growth (deviation from annual industry average), and a PE indicator (equals one for each country-industry-year with any PE activity). Exogenous variables are these variables lagged with the lag in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels of Wald tests of the joint significance of the PE, productivity, and labor coefficients are reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
(1) (1) 0.120** 0.267*** 0.001 0.048 0.252*** 0.000 (0.049) (0.046) (0.002) (0.055) (0.043) (0.002) Prod. Growth (2) -0.086 -0.002 0.002 -0.162*** 0.039 0.002 (0.060) (0.034) (0.002) (0.060) (0.034) (0.002) Prod. Growth (3) 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.006*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.005** (0.036) (0.039) (0.002) (0.041) (0.038) (0.002) Prod. Growth (4) 0.075** 0.076** 0.002 0.081** 0.059* 0.002 (0.035) (0.034) (0.002) (0.039) (0.034) (0.002) Prod. Growth (5) 0.171*** 0.075*** 0.003*** 0.144*** 0.072*** 0.001 (0.029) (0.019) (0.001) (0.031) (0.016) (0.001) Labor Growth (1) -0.019 -0.085 -0.005 0.091 -0.074 -0.005 (0.093) (0.052) (0.003) (0.103) (0.046) (0.003) Labor Growth (2) -0.120 -0.089** -0.006** -0.022 -0.123*** -0.004 (0.088) (0.036) (0.003) (0.085) (0.038) (0.003) Labor Growth (3) -0.158* -0.131*** -0.010*** -0.123 -0.110*** -0.009*** (0.082) (0.033) (0.003) (0.082) (0.032) (0.003) Labor Growth (4) -0.189** -0.097*** -0.005** -0.244*** -0.097*** -0.004* (0.075) (0.031) (0.002) (0.084) (0.034) (0.002) Labor Growth (5) -0.018 -0.032 0.002* -0.010 -0.040* 0.001 (0.026) (0.025) (0.001) (0.031) (0.024) (0.001) Prob[PE = 0] 0.007*** 0.014** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.000*** Prob[Prod. = 0] 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.039** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.158 Prob[Labor = 0] 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.026** Observations 4,309 4,301 4,432 4,766 4,758 4,889
